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HANGING UP ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH:
MOSER V. FCC
Paul S. Zimmerman
Abstract: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Moser v. FCC upheld the
constitutionality of provisions in the Telephone Consumers Protection Act which prevent the
commercial use of devices that deliver a pre-recorded sales message to home telephones. This
Note examines the history of the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of commercial speech and
argues that the Ninth Circuit decision failed to apply criteria reflective of the Court's
conception of the significant role played by commercial speech in our economy and society.

During the past thirty years the U.S. Supreme Court has increased the
protection granted to commercial speech under the First Amendment of
the Constitution. Although such profit-oriented speech still does not
enjoy the full level of freedom that has been upheld for political and
artistic speech, the trend of Court decisions has nevertheless been toward
demanding more compelling and precisely justified state interests before
statutes impinging on commercial speech are upheld against the rights of
vendors to advertise their wares.
In an era in which products are developed and improved with ever
accelerating speed and when economic well-being depends more and
more on communication between service providers and consumers, the
Court has understood that "significant societal interests are served by
such speech. Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry
information of import to significant issues of the day."'
In response to this realization, the Court has concluded that
commercial speech now needs greater freedom than it has been afforded
in the past. But, the very technological innovation about which
consumers need increased information has also increased the speed and
capacity with which information is disseminated-ironically to the point
of overload. The relentless barrage of television, radio and print
advertising, door-to-door solicitors and the intrusive electronic chirp of
the phone call that brings an unwanted, recorded sales pitch,
"interrupting a meal, a restful soak in the bathtub, even intruding on the
intimacy of the bedroom,"2 have come to be seen as symptomatic of a

1. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,364 (1977).
2. State v. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d 882, 888-89 (Minn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.

1006 (1993).
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hectoring modem world from which people cannot even escape into the
privacy of their own homes.
It was to address citizens' concerns about telephone solicitation that
Congress in 1991 passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA) which, among other things, bans the use of some--though not
all---prerecorded telephone messages.3 Similar state measures have met a
mixed fate in the courts;4 the provisions of the federal act relating to
recorded commercial solicitations were upheld by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Moser v. FCC,5 which overturned a federal trial
court decision declaring the TCPA to be in violation of the First
Amendment.6
This Note argues that Moser was incorrectly decided. Part I examines
the recent trends in U.S. Supreme Court cases considering the free
speech rights of commercial communicators. Part II examines the
specific test which the Court has developed for determining whether
governmental regulations unconstitutionally abridge comnercial speech
rights. Part III analyzes the Moser decision in the context of those trends.
Part IV identifies areas in which Moser departs from Supreme Court
doctrine and suggests that the district court opinion applied a more
correct interpretation of the law.
I.

EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE

A.

FirstAmendment Protections

It is axiomatic that the First Amendment guarantee of free speech is
not absolute; 7 government may restrict speech rights to Ihe extent that
they are used to subvert its ability to prevent "substantive evils,"' an idea
succinctly exemplified by Justice Holmes's well-known comment that
the right to free speech may not be extended to protect one who falsely

3. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (West Supp.
1994)). See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text for relevant portions.
4. Compare Casino Marketing., 491 N.W.2d 882 (upholding state ban) with Lysaght v. New
Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646 (D.N.J. 1993) and Moser v. Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d 12:34 (Or. 1993) (both
overturning state bans).
5. 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2615 (1995).
6. Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360 (D. Or. 1993).
7. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 430 (1989); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571 (1942); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466,474 (1920).
8. Schenek v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (upholding ban on anti-draft agitation during
World War I).
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cries fire and causes panic in a theatre.9 Certain categories of speech have
been denied First Amendment protection altogether as a matter of their
content." The Court has held that obscenity," libel and slander, 2
fighting words, 3 and incitement to violence, 4 as well as speech of the
type indicated in Justice Holmes's example, all lie outside the bounds of
the First Amendment guarantee.
Speech which is entitled to First Amendment protection may not be
abridged on the basis of its content; it may, however, be subjected to
reasonable regulations based on the time, place or manner in which it is
expressed.' 5 The Court applies a three-prong test to determine the
constitutional validity of a regulation purporting to be a time, place, or
manner regulation: first, the regulation must be content-neutral; second,
it must further a "significant governmental interest"; and third, it must
"leave open ample alternative channels" through which the regulated
speech can find expression. 6
B.

The CommercialSpeech Exception

In 1940, F.J. Chrestensen owned and exhibited for profit a former U.S.
Navy submarine which he had docked at a state pier in New York City. 7
When he attempted to advertise the attraction on handbills distributed in
the city streets, he ran afoul of a municipal ordinance preventing such
distribution of "commercial and business advertising matter."' 8 Upon
learning that handbills devoted solely to information or public protest
could be lawfully distributed, Chrestensen printed a new run, one side of
which featured his ad for the sub and the other a protest against the city's
refusal to grant him a berth for the display of his vessel at a city dock,
which he apparently would have preferred to the state-run facility. 9
Informed by the police that his double-sided handbill could not be
distributed, he brought suit to enjoin their interference and succeeded
9. Id.
10. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
11. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981).

17. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 52-53 (1942).
18. Id. at 53.
19. Id.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 71:571, 1996

through the level of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals."' The Supreme
Court, however, refused to sustain the injunction that had been granted
below, abruptly refusing to "indulge nice appraisal based upon subtle
distinctions" of the sort that had caused the appeals court to ponder the
difficulty in separating "what is of public interest and what is for private
profit."'" While noting that states and municipalities could not unduly
burden opinion and information, the Supreme Court pronounced itself
"clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising."22 Chrestensen's attachment of a
political protest apparently did not, in the Court's view, introduce any
protectable impurities into his intent to advertise. The so-called
"commercial speech exception" was born, effectively placing
advertising, along with obscenity, fighting words, and incitement to
violence in the class of speech denied First Amendment protection.
A decade later, in Breard v. City of Alexandria, the Court upheld a
municipal ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation against
complaints that it violated the First Amendment.23 The item being soldmagazine subscriptions--gave the Court (and particularly Justice Black,
who, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented)' some pause because the
magazines themselves were clearly entitled to First Amendment
protection. But Justice Reed, writing for the majority and noting that
"[o]nly the press or oral advocates of ideas could urge this point," which
was "not open to the solicitors for gadgets or brushes,"2 distinguished
the method of sale from the product and determined that the
constitutional question turned on a balance between the privacy of the
householder and the publisher's right to distribute in an effective
manner.

26

Privacy was of great concern to Justice Reed, who discussed the
"rapid concentration" of post-war housing patterns as it affected
solicitation and householders' reaction to solicitation.27 Where the
isolated rural dweller of the past might welcome the occasional drummer

20. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941).
21. 316 U.S.at 55.
22. Id. at 54.
23. 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (also rejecting challenges based on the Due Process and Commerce
Clause).
24. Id. at 649-50 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
25. Id. at 641.
26. Id. at644.
27. Id.at 626.
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who came with news and new products, door-to-door salesmen had now
become largely a nuisance.2 8 The majority found the balance tilted in
favor of privacy, concluding that the right of communities to ensure the
privacy of their residents did not abridge the First Amendment.29
The Breard opinion still embodies the notion that "purely
commercial" speech is to be distinguished from information and opinion
and is beyond the perimeters of First Amendment protection.30 Although
this notion would soon change, the right of communities to legislate on
behalf of their citizens' privacy has retained its force as one of the
compelling state interests that have been effectively opposed to the right
of free speech. 3
In 1964, in the renowned New York Times v. Sullivan case, the Court
sustained First Amendment protection for a paid political advertisement
against a challenge that the ad, attacking Alabama authorities' opposition
to the civil rights movement, was "commercial" and therefore not
entitled to such protection.32 The Court distinguished Chrestensen,
maintaining the distinction between purely commercial ads and ads
which "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited
grievances, protested claimed abuses and sought financial support on
behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the
highest public interest and concern."33 Although, as the above language
indicates, the commercial advertisement remained a more or less
contemptible form of expression in the Court's 1964 jurisprudence,
history had already shown that the contemptible might come to garner
sufficient respect to merit First Amendment protection.
In 1952, such protection had been upheld for commercial motion
pictures, even though "their production, distribution and exhibition is a
large-scale business conducted for private profit."34 Analogizing films to
printed publications, which did not lose protection just because they were
28. Id.
29. Id. at 645. Prefiguring the "ample alternative channels" prong of the time, place or manner
test, Justice Reed noted that those who wanted a subscription to the magazines in question had
means other than door-to-door solicitation by which to obtain it. Id. at 644.
30. Even Justice Black, who would have extended First Amendment protection to magazine
subscription solicitors, was careful to include a footnote making it clear that he intended no such
protection for a "merchant... selling pots." Id. at 650 (unnumbered note) (Black, J., dissenting).
31. See Rita Marie Cain, Call Up Someone and Just Say "Buy"-Telemarketing and the
RegulatoryEnvironment,31 Am. Bus. L.J. 641,644 & n.22 (1994).
32. 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964).
33. Id. at 267.
34. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
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sold for a profit,35 the Court overruled a 1915 decision which had
rejected the idea that "motion pictures and other spectacle" should be
compared to the free press.3 6 The Court reasoned that "the judicial sense,
supporting the common sense of the country is against the contention"
and that "[i]t cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving
pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and conducted for
37
profit."
In Burstyn, the distinction between profit-oriented speech and
informative or opinion-giving speech no longer seemed quite so pure and
simple, at least in the case of movies, which probably reflects the greater
credibility as an art form that films had attained between 1915 and
1952.38 This extension of old protections to a new form of
communication laid the groundwork for further expansion of the
categories of communication that would be held to convey protected
information and opinion. It also reflected a growing tendency to
recognize that profit-seeking and information-providing are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. But the expansion was a slow one, and it
took another quarter century before the Court was willing to conclude
that advertisements, the most purely and simply commercial of all
communication, could convey protectable information.
C.

IncreasingProtectionFor CommercialSpeech

In 1975, in Bigelow v. Virginia,39 the Court, picking up the strands of
a theme that had been raised in earlier cases,4" limited the significance of
Chrestensen to upholding only "a reasonable regulation of the manner in
which commercial advertising could be distributed."'" Writing for the
majority, Justice Blackmun emphasized that Chrestensen "obviously
does not support any sweeping proposition that advertising is

35. Id. at 501-02.
36. Mutual Film Corp v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
37. Id.at 244.
38. Compare Burstyn 343 U.S. at 501 ("It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant
medium for the communication of ideas.") with the supercilious attitude of Mutu l Film Corp., 236
U.S. at 244 ("other spectacle").
39. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
40. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6. (1974) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Justice
dissenting); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
Douglas had been part of the Chrestensen majority.
41. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 819.
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unprotected per se."42 Bigelow upheld First Amendment protection for an
ad placed in a Virginia paper by a New York abortion-referral agency on
the ground that, in addition to proposing a commercial transaction, it
contained factual material of wider significance.43 The Court stressed that
information contained in the ad could be of general public interest (e.g.,
to those seeking change in Virginia laws which prohibited abortion)
beyond its specific commercial interest to those who might want to avail
themselves of the paid service offered by the referral agency.'
The following year, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,45 the Court finally dispensed entirely with
the commercial speech exception in striking down a Virginia law that
forbade pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs.
What is striking about the reasoning of the decision is a new attitude
toward the value of advertising which stands in sharp contrast to the
previous derision. Gone is the distinction between a category of valuable
information and opinion (from which the publication of information
purely about products offered for sale is by its very nature excluded) and
an inferior category deemed to be of less public value. Advertising is
now seen per se to occupy an important part in the life of the nation, such
that:
[N]o line between publicly "interesting" or "important" commercial
advertising and the opposite kind could ever be drawn. Advertising,
however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing
and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So
long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public
interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and

42. Id. at 820.
43. Id. at 822.
44. Id. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist was unimpressed with Blackmun's reasoning:
If Virginia may not regulate advertising of commercial abortion agencies because of the interest
of those seeking to reform Virginia's abortion laws, it is difficult to see why it is not likewise
precluded from regulating advertising for an out-of-state bucket shop on the ground that such
information might be of interest to those interested in repealing Virginia's "blue sky" laws.
Id.at 831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable.46
In reaching this opinion, the Court relied explicitly on Ihe free-speech
theories of Alexander Meiklejohn, which emphasized the importance of
information availability to the democratic political process. 47 The Court's
reasoning also implicitly reflects the anti-Keynesian, neo-classical
economic theories (with their emphasis on market-driven decision
making and the necessity of accurate information to make that process
efficient) which had come to the fore in the 1970s.48 This sensitivity to
contemporary economic attitudes is analogous to the: change that
occurred in the Court's attitude toward movies between 1915 and 1952
in that it too reflects evolving opinion.
Despite abandoning the commercial speech exception, the Court was
not willing to overlook what it called the "commonsense differences"
between commercial speech and "other varieties. ' '45' Specifically
mentioned are two features which the Court finds particular to
commercial speech and which give it strength to withstand regulation:
the greater ease with which its truth (as contrasted with the truth of
"news reporting or political commentary") is able to be verified (because
the disseminator can be presumed to know more about its product than
anyone else) and the centrality of advertising to commercial
profitability. 50 The latter attribute is sufficient, in the Court's view, to
insure the vigor and persistence of commercial speech, so that "there is
little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone
entirely.'
The door is thus still open for government to encumber commercial
speech with restrictions that would not be tolerated if placed on political
speech; and while it may seem that not much has in fact changed beyond
the semantics of dropping "commercial speech exception" from the
46. Id. at 765. The Court exerted considerable effort to discuss the value of full information in the
contex of drug price availability. Id. at 763-65, and nn.18,20.
47. Id. at 765 n.19. The Court mentioned with approval Meikeljohn's 1948 book Free Speech and
Its Relation to Self-Government. For a discussion of Meiklejohn's influence on free speech
jurisprudence, see Edwin P. Rome & William H. Roberts, Corporate and Commercial Free Speech
201-04 (1985).
48. See, e.g., Milton Friedman,' Capitalism and Freedom 16-21 (1962) (urging the interconnectedness of free speech and free markets). In 1976, the year of the VirginiaPharmacydecision,
Friedman won the Nobel Prize for Economics. Wo.rldAlmanac andBook of Facts31 6 (1995).
49. Virginia Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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judicial lexicon, the change in attitude is significant. Restrictions are now
permissible because commercial speech is seen to be vital and capable of
bearing up under the challenge and, in the aggregate, a public benefitnot because it is despicable and unworthy of protection. The practical
result of this changed attitude is a willingness, manifest in the decisions
which followed Virginia Pharmacy, to give advertisers greater freedom
to have their say. The door allowing governmental restriction is still
open, but not as wide as it once was; and the Court is prepared to
exercise judicial scrutiny to assure that First Amendment guarantees are
preserved.
In the new attitude toward commercial speech there is, moreover, a
concomitant new attitude toward the consuming public, which had been
largely ignored in the pre-Virginia Pharmacy consideration of
commercial First Amendment cases, although there are hints at it in
Bigelow's conception of a general public interest that overlays the
particular commercial interest of the advertiser. 2 The Court now
emphasizes that the issue is not only the advertiser's right to disseminate
information, but also the public's right and need to receive it; and the
Court criticizes the "highly paternalistic approach," evidenced by
Virginia's assumption that its regulation protected consumers against the
threat that they would be duped by the blandishments of advertising into
sacrificing the benefits of "professional" pharmacists' advice in
exchange for low prices.5 3 The "alternative" attitude, which the Court
finds enacted in the First Amendment, is "to assume. . . that people will
perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed."54 If there is a choice to be made "between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely
available," the First Amendment has already made that choice and
decided that the greater danger lies in suppression. 5
II.

THE CONTOURS OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH RIGHTS

In the years following Virginia Pharmacy's enunciation of a policy
emphasizing greater Constitutional protection for commercial speech, the
Court decided a series of cases in which it developed general guidelines

52. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822, 829 (1975). See supratext accompanying note 43.
53. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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for applying the policy and, inter alia, specifically considered the conflict
between free speech and privacy rights.
A.

The Central Hudson Test

In CentralHudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission, the
Court examined the history of its commercial speech cases and
concluded that "a four-part analysis has developed."56 The four-step
process outlined in CentralHudson remains the touchstone for assessing
whether government regulation of commercial speecl exceeds the
bounds of First Amendment protection:
At the outset we must detenmine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and
not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
it is not mo:re extensive
governmental interest asserted, and whether
57
interest.
that
serve
to
necessary
is
than
In Central Hudson, the issue in dispute was whether the state Public
Service Commission could ban an energy company's advertising aimed
at promoting energy use by the consuming public.5 ' The ban, initially
implemented to forestall a threatered energy shortage in the winter of
1973-74, was extended by the Commission in 1977, apparently in
response to public opinion.5 ' Applying the four-step analysis, the Court
found no fault either with the legality of Central Hudson's activity or
with the two interests---energy conservation and fair rates--advanced by
the state; nor did it deny that the ban directly advanced conservation.6
But the Court found the Commission's claim that the ban also promoted
rate equity to be too "tenuous" and "remote" to justify the Suppression of
advertising.6 ' Thus, the Court went on to apply the fourth part of the test
only in regard to the conservation interest, and found the ban, which
"reaches all promotional advertising, regardless of the impact . .. on
overall energy use," too broad to withstand constitutional scrutiny,
56. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 558.

59. Id. at 559.
60. Id. at 566-69.
61. Id. at 569.
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especially because the Commission had not shown that a less
restrictive
62
ban would be inadequate to achieve its conservation interest.
B.

Privacy

On the same day that it handed down CentralHudson, the Court also
announced its decision in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Commission, which struck down another New York Public Service
Commission restriction, this one banning insert ads discussing "political
issues" which the utility included in customer bills.63 Although the New
York State Court of Appeals had upheld the prohibition on the grounds
that it protected the privacy of individuals upon whom the utility might
be imposing its unwanted views, the Supreme Court rejected this
"captive audience"' reasoning, noting that the government had a right to
protect privacy by banning speech only when "substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."65 Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, declined to find any such major
intrusion where "[t]he customer of Consolidated Edison may escape
exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring the bill insert
from envelope to wastebasket."66 Moreover, he concluded that even if
there had been a compelling state interest in protecting customers against
overtly intrusive bill inserts, the state could have advanced it by
requiring Consolidated Edison to stop sending the inserts to customers
who objected;67 in other words, by adopting a less restrictive ban.
The speech at issue in ConsolidatedEdison was related to important
public policy considerations and therefore protected by the full measure
of First Amendment coverage; but the case is in line with a series of
decisions which suggest that the receipt of information by mail,
including commercial solicitations, does not usually amount to a
62. Id. at 569-71. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist, renewing themes also displayed in his Bigelow
and Virginia Pharmacy dissents, criticized the majority for "improperly substitut[ing] its own
judgment for that of the State in deciding how a proper ban on promotional advertising should be
drafted," and complained more generally that the fourth prong of the newly delineated test would
undermine legislatures' ability to promote local interests. Id. at 585 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829-36 (discussed supra text accompanying note 43);
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 781-90

(1976).
63. 447 U.S. 530, 532 (1980). The inserts promoted the use of nuclear power.
64. Id. at 541-42 (overturning 390 N.E.2d 749 (N.Y. 1979)).
65. Id. at 541 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
66. Id. at 542.
67. Id. at 542 n.lI.
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substantial invasion of the privacy interest. The trend of the Court's
thinking in this area suggests that the threat to privacy becomes
substantial enough to merit government protection of the individual's
interest in either of two circumstances: when the individual cannot
reasonably avoid an unwanted message or when the message is delivered
in a situation containing the potential for manipulation or coercion of the
recipient by the communicator.
1.

Unavoidability

The classic example of the first type of invasion is found in Kovacs v.
Cooper, in which the court dismissed a First Amendment challenge to a
Trenton, N.J., ordinance that, in deference to citizens' desire for peace
and quiet, forbade sound trucks emitting "loud and raucous noises" from
the city streets.68 In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, the Court upheld a
ban on political advertising in street cars as an invasion of the privacy of
passengers who couldn't avoid the message if they wan:ed to use the
transportation. 69 But, as the Court noted in ConsolidatedEdison, these
are unusual situations and do not invalidate the usual doctrine, which
holds that the need to protect privacy is not compelling enough to justify
abridgment of free speech when those seeking privacy can help
themselves to avoid the offensive message.70 In ConsolidatedEdison, the
Court cited its 1971 decision in Cohen v. California, which overturned
the disturbing the peace conviction of a man who had worn a jacket
bearing an obscene anti-war message in the corridors of a Los Angeles
courthouse, rejecting an appeal to the privacy interests of the "women
and children" who might see it and be offended because they could
"effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by
averting their eyes.'
The same emphasis on a "self-help" solution had been implicit in the
Court's reasoning when it addressed the issue of home privacy in 1943 in
Martin v. City of Struthers.72 In Martin, an Ohio municipality's
ordinance, enacted to protect citizens' privacy, forbade people to "ring
the doorbell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon" residents in

68. 336 U.S. 77, 78, 85 (1949).
69. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
70. ConsolidatedEdison,447 U.S. at 539-42.
71. Id. at 542 (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. 15,21, 22 n.4 (1971)).
72. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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order to give them "circulars or other advertisements." 73 The Court
conceded the validity of the objective, but concluded that the decision to
exclude unwanted communications should "depend upon the will of the
individual master of each household, and not upon the determination of
the community."'74
2.

Coercion

In 1977, following the principles that had been set out in Virginia
Pharmacy, the Court, in Bates v. State Bar, voided an Arizona rule that
banned lawyer advertising.75 The contention of the Arizona Bar
Association that an ad ban encouraged professionalism---a legitimate
state interest-was rejected as "severely strained., 76 The Court, again
applying its antipaternalism reasoning, found that the public's interest in
receiving information and its ability to make informed commercial
decisions outweighed any possible harm that advertising might cause.77
The next year, however, the Court upheld state disciplinary action
against an Ohio lawyer named Ohralik for violating the state code of
professional responsibility by soliciting the business of two young
accident victims-one of whom he approached and induced to retain his
services while she lay in traction in 'her hospital bed.78 Ohralik
challenged the regulation on First Amendment grounds, relying on
Bates.79 The Court rejected his argument, drawing the distinction that
"in-person solicitation," as opposed to the newspaper ad that had been at
issue in Bates, "may exert pressure and often demands an immediate
response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or
reflection.'" The Court further reasoned that such pressure was
detrimental to the informed decision-making which had been the
cornerstone of its decision to strike down the bans in Virginia Pharmacy
and Bates.
73. Id. at 142.
74. Id. at 141. The Court emphasized that the ordinance was subject to the First Amendment
because it was not directed solely at commercial advertising. Id. at 141 n.1. Cf. Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1951) (distinguishing Martin under the commercial speech
exception), discussed supra at notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
75. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
76. Id. at 368.
77. Id. at 374-75.
78. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
79. Id. at 455.
80. Id. at 457-58.
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By contrast, in Edenfield v. Fane, the Court struck down a Florida
regulation which prevented certified public accountants (CPAs) from
making in-person solicitations (defined to include live telephone calls),
noting that, unlike a lawyer, "a CPA is not 'a professional trained in the
art of persuasion'. A CPA's training emphasizes independence and
objectivity, not advocacy."'" Moreover, the CPA's prospective clients
would be "sophisticated and experienced business executives who
understand well the services that a CPA offers" and, unlike the accident
victims approached by Ohralik "at a moment of high stress and
vulnerability," the executives, "[i]f they are unreceptive to his initial
telephone solicitation, [they] need only terminate the call. Invasion of
privacy is not a significant concern."82
In Zauderer v. Office of DisciplinaryCounsel, the Court, voiding a bar
association rule under which a lawyer had been disciplined for a
newspaper advertisement soliciting clients, distinguished Ohralik and
again emphasized the difference between printed ads and the in-person
solicitation that "justified a prophylactic rule prohibiting lawyers from
engaging in such solicitation for pecuniary gain., 83 The Court took note
also of the "coercive force of the personal presence of a trained
advocate."84 The lesser coercive power of non-personal solicitations was
once more emphasized in a 1988 decision, Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n, overturning a state ban on personalized solicitation letters sent
by lawyers to prospective clients who were targeted specifically because
they faced the threat of home mortgage foreclosure. Although conceding
that recipients of the letters were in a vulnerable position, the Court
found that the relevant inquiry was not simply whether the "condition" of
the message recipients made them peculiarly susceptible to undue
influence, "but whether the mode of communication" employed by the
solicitor implied a capacity for exploiting that susceptibility. 6 The
written solicitation did not expose the recipient to a mode of
communication comparable in exploitative potential to that which existed
when he had "a badgering advocate breathing down his neck."87

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

507 U.S. 761, 775 (1993) (quoting Ohralik,436 U.S. at 465).
Id. at 775-76.
471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985).
Id. at 642.
486 U.S. 466 (1988).

86. Id. at 474.
87. Id. at 475.
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The Court's reasoning in these cases indicates that providing
commercial information will not be deemed an invasion of privacy
unless it is undertaken in circumstances in which the speaker can
exercise superior professional knowledge or persuasive skill to exploit
the ignorance or emotional distress of a vulnerable hearer, or when the
hearer is deprived of the opportunity to reflect and consider. The
distinction between lawyers and accountants which the Court drew in
Edenfield suggests that the potential for exploiting a form of
communication that is susceptible to such exploitation is also dependent
on the persuasive expertise of the communicator. 8

III. MOSER V. FCC
A.

Facts and ProceduralHistory

In 1989, Kathryn and Ronald Moser set up a chimney sweep business
in Salem, Oregon. Experience in Utah had taught them that the most
effective method of finding customers was through the use of an
Automatic Dialing Announcing Device (ADAD), a telecomputer which
dials preprogrammed phone numbers to deliver a recorded message.8 9
After successfully litigating to overturn an Oregon statute that banned the
use of such devices for commercial purposes,9" the Mosers sought to
enjoin enforcement of those sections of the federal Telephone Consumer

88. But cf.Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 2371 (1995) (upholding a 30-day ban on
lawyer solicitation letters targeted directly to accident victims or their survivors). Over a strong
dissent by Justice Kennedy, the 5-4 majority ignored the previous distinctions between in-person and
written solicitations and distinguished Shapero on the grounds that its "treatment of privacy was
casual" and that the asserted state interest in the case was not privacy at all but "the special dangers
of overreaching inhering in targeted solicitations"--an interest which failed because of the State's
failure to advance credible evidence of its claim. Id. at 2378. In Went For It, by contrast, the Court
found the evidence sufficient to justify the Florida Bar's contention that targeted solicitation letters
sent within 30 days of an accident constituted an invasion of privacy which the State could prohibit.
Id. at 2377-78. This opinion represents a divergence from the "in-person" reasoning of the earlier
cases, suggesting, in contrast to Shapero, that the vulnerability of the message recipient can be as
significant a concern as the "mode of communication" in determining whether an invasion of privacy
is intolerable. More importantly, Went For It suggests that "outrage and irritation"-there was no
suggestion that the letters were coercive-will be added to unavoidability and the possibility of
coercion in determining whether privacy rights have been invaded in a manner that merits
governmental protection. Id. at 2379. Significantly, the Court rejected the efficacy in this instance of
the self-help remedy of throwing out the offending letters on the ground that the outrage to the
bereaved or injured was complete once the letter was seen. Id.
89. Brief for Appellees at 3-4, Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-35686).
90. Moser v. Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d 1284 (Or. 1993).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 71:571, 1996

Protection Act (TCPA) which ban the commercial use of ADADs.9" The
district court granted an injunction; 92 the Ninth Circuit reversed.93
B.

THE NINTH CIRCUITDECISION
The TCPA provides, in relevant part, that:
It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States...

(B) to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line
using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without
the prior express consent of the called party, unless the call is
initiated for emergency purposes or is exempted by rule or order by
Communications] Commission under paragraph
the [Federal
4
(2)(B).1

Paragraph (2) orders the FCC to prescribe implementing regulations,
enables it to consider extending the ban on artificial or prerecorded calls
to businesses, and states that it:
(B) may, by rule or order, exempt from the requirements of
paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, subject to such conditions as
the Commission may prescribe(i) calls that are not made for a commercial purpose; and
(ii) such classes or categories of calls made for commercial
purposes as the Commission determines(I) will not adversely affect the privacy rights that this section is
intended to protect; and
(II) do not include the transmission
advertisement...."

of any unsolicited

On its face, then, the statute creates at least two distinctions between
the types of messages which may be exempted and those which may not.
First, § 227(b)(2)(B)(i) separates non-commercial calls into a separate
91. 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West Supp. 1994).
92. Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360 (D. Or. 1993).
93. 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995).
94. 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(1) (West Supp. 1994).
95. 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2) (West Supp. 1994).
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category from commercial calls; second, § 227(b)(2)(B)(ii) creates a
distinction between commercial calls that will or will not adversely affect
privacy rights.96 The statute empowers the FCC to create exemptions for
recordings that deliver a non-commercial message or a commercial
message that the FCC deems not to have an adverse effect on privacy
rights, but forbids it from making such exemptions for recordings that
deliver either commercial ads or other commercial messages it deems to
invade privacy.97
In striking down the section, the district court concluded that the
statute was content-based because it "established a distinction between
commercial and non-commercial speech in the implementing instructions
it provides to the FCC."98 The government had argued that the statute
itself was a reasonable, content-neutral time, place or manner restriction
because it banned all automated calls and left it to the FCC to implement
any exemptions.99 The trial court rejected this contention, however,
noting a House Committee Report that indicated legislative intent to
distinguish "the speech of charitable and political organizations" from
"commercial speech," on the supposition that restrictions on the latter
were less likely to run afoul of the First Amendment, and that the former
presented less of a privacy problem."ta
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ignored both the plain meaning of the
statute and the evidence of legislative intent to rule that "[t]he statute
does not distinguish between commercial and noncommercial calls,
except as it makes a reference to calls not made for a commercial
purpose that the FCC is granted permission to exempt by regulation
under conditions it may prescribe."'' The court went on to explain the
inherent contradiction in the above sentence by explaining that the
language of the statute "is permissive, not mandatory. It in no way
requires the FCC to adopt such exemptions by regulation, order or

96. It is uncertain whether unsolicited advertisements are conceived per se to fall into the category
of commercial calls that adversely affect privacy rights or whether they comprise yet a third distinct
category. The point, however, is not how many categories of distinction are made but that they are
made at all and that they are made on the basis of the content of the message delivered. See supra
note 15 and accompanying text.
97. The FCC implemented regulations exempting calls "not made for a commercial purpose," 47
C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(1) (1995) and calls by "a tax-exempt non-profit organization," 47 C.F.R.

§ 64.1200(c)(4) (1995).
98. Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D. Or. 1993).
99. Id. at 363.
100. Id. at 362-63 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1991)).
101. Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970,973 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995).
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otherwise."' 2 The court cites no authority for its 'reliance on a
juxtaposition between mandatory and permissive grants of power to
support its conclusion that statutory permission for a government agency
to prescribe regulatory exemptions for one group but not for another
creates no distinction between the two groups. 3
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE DECISION
The Ninth Circuit erred in its analysis of the First Amendment
consequences of the ADAD ban under the TCPA by failing to assess
correctly the content-based nature of the restrictions which the statute
imposes on commercial speech alone among all the types of messages
that can be delivered by means of an ADAD. The court also failed to
properly apply the principles regarding protection of commercial speech
which the U.S. Supreme Court has developed and to give proper regard
to the way in which the Court has analyzed and resolved the conflicts
that have arisen between free speech and privacy.
A.

The ContentNeutrality Determination

Having concluded that the relevant provisions of the TCPA do not
distinguish between commercial and noncommercial calls, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the district court's application of the four-part Central
Hudson test for commercial speech in favor of analyzing the statute as a
content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner for "all
automated telemarketing calls wi-thout regard to whether they are
commercial or noncommercial."'" The court minimized the difference
between the two approaches, calling the tests for each "essentially
identical," on the authority of Boardof Trustees of the State University of
New York v. Fox."5 This was, however, a misapplication of Fox, in
which the Court used the words "substantially similar,"' 6 quoting its
own statement in San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Committee, which had limited the similarity to the particular

102. Id.
103. The Government's brief similarly cites no authority to support the proposition and allegesbut does not argue the point--that the TCPA sections should be judged as content-neutral.
Appellant's Brief at 14, Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-35686).
104. 46 F.3d at 973.
105. Id. (citing 492 U.S. 469 (1989)).
106. Fox, 492 U.S. at 477.
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facts of that case.'0 7 In Fox, the reference to a similarity between the tests
concerned the rejection of a standard for judging the possible
overbreadth of government regulation of commercial speech (least
restrictive means) which would be more stringent than the "narrowly
tailored" criterion applied to "core political speech."' ' The Ninth
Circuit's interpretation created a broader proposition than the Court
intended and overlooked significant distinctions in the way that
commercial speech restrictions and content-neutral speech restrictions
have been treated by the Court. The government is permitted to impose
restrictions on the time, place or manner of protected speech if those
restrictions are justified without reference to content, advance a
significant governmental interest, and if they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication." 9 In contrast, the Supreme
Court has "consistently rejected the suggestion that a government may
justify a content-based prohibition
by showing that speakers have
' 10
alternative means of expression."
Upon adopting the starting point that the TCPA is content-neutral, the
Ninth Circuit proceeded to an analysis heavily weighted by the finding
that the Act's restrictions "leave open many alternative channels of
communication."''. The court determined that the availability of live
solicitation, taped messages introduced by live speakers, and taped
messages to which consumers had previously consented left open the
required ample alternative channels of communication." 2 This entire
analysis side-steps the issue presented by the Mosers' case--that the use
of ADADs remains available to noncommercial users while it is
proscribed for commercial users. Moreover, in its discussion of the
alternative channels available, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the substantial

107. 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987). In San FranciscoArts, a congressional grant of trademark
rights to the United States Olympic Committee for the term "Olympic" was challenged by a group
seeking to promote a "Gay Olympic Games." Id. at 525. The would-be promoters argued that their
intent in using the term was not simply commercial exploitation, but also to express a political
statement about gay rights. Id. at 535. In the context of determining whether the grant's "incidental
restrictions" on First Amendment rights were greater than necessary to further the government's
interest in rewarding the U.S.O.C., the Court indicated that, given the facts of the case, the inquiry
into the effect on both commercial and political speech rights was sufficiently similar that the two
could be considered together. Id. at 535-38.
108. 492 U.S. at 476-78.
109. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
110. Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 n.10 (1980) (including a
list of cases); reiterated in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410,430 (1993).
I1. Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995).
112. Id.
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cost difference between ADADs and the supposedly appropriate
alternative channels, again based on the supposition of the statute's
content neutrality." 13
In dealing with a content-based restriction, particular care is required
in establishing the balance between the government's interest and the
means chosen to advance it. This is not to imply that the inquiry into a
content-neutral restriction shouldn't also be conducted with care, but
rather that when a particular type of speech is singled out for exclusion
on the basis of its content, the required degree of vigilance must be
higher because the very decision to apply restrictions on a selective basis
contains within it a greater possibility for discrimination against that
content and, consequently, a greater need for courts to search for
indications of discrimination. The evolving history of decisions in the
area of commercial speech underscores the Supreme Court's sensitivity
to this possibility, and to the possibility that the importance of
commercial speech will be undervalued by government." 4
In adopting a content-neutral analysis and emphasizing the availability
of communicative channels other than the ADAD, the Ninth Circuit's
consideration of the conflict between the constitutional protection
accorded commercial speech and the government's interest in preserving
privacy failed to respond adequately to the concern :For protecting
commercial speech underlying the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. As
detailed in part II of this Note, the Supreme Court has given an
increasing emphasis to the significance of commercial speech in
maintaining the vibrancy of our economic system by providing product
and pricing information which are essential to enlightened consumer
choices.' 15 The Ninth Circuit's adoption of a content-ne'atral analysis,
and its consequent assertion that alternative means of communication

113. Id. The court cited Kovacs v. Cooper, 33 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949), which rtjected an argument
based on the comparative cheapness of a sound truck compared to handbills and other forms of
political communication; it ignored the Court's statement in Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 516 (1981) that when "other forms of advertising are insufficient, inappropriate and
prohibitively expensive," the ample alternative channels requirement is not met. An ADAD costs
about $1800; "predictive dialers," machines capable of integrating a live speaker who introduces a
recorded message, start at $48,000 (more than 2500% more) and, of course, entail labor costs which
an ADAD user can avoid. This adds a substantial, often insurmountable burden to the advertising
costs of small and start-up businesses. Brief for Appellees at 7, Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.
1995) (No. 93-35686). Kovacs is a prototype of the content-neutral time, place or manner test that
developed from its progeny; Metromedia is a commercial speech case to which the CentralHudson
test was applied.
114. See City of Cincinnati,507 U.S. at 418-19.
115. See supranote 46 and accompanying text.
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will compensate for the inability to use ADADs in commercial
solicitation-without consideration that the cost differences entailed by
those alternative means will, in many cases, eliminate vendors' ability to
disseminate information of potential use to consumers-underscores its
insensitivity to the factors that the Court has deemed to be important in
looking at commercial speech restrictions. In failing to apply the Central
Hudson test, the Ninth Circuit has cut itself off from the reasoning of
those cases which have specifically considered the issue of commercial
speech restrictions and so has ignored the policy choices that have
guided the Supreme Court's protection of commercial speech.
B.

BalancingPrivacy and Freedom of CommercialSpeech

A general inquiry into the balance between the competing interests of
privacy and free speech as applied to ADADs is implied by the third and
fourth steps of the Central Hudson test." 6 While the district court
examined the balance in detail," 7 the Ninth Circuit, under the rubric of
its time, place or manner evaluation, was content to rely on the
questionable results presented in congressional reports without any
discussion of the assumptions and findings underlying those reports." 8
Although noting that deference to congressional fact-finding does not
"foreclose the court's independent judgment of the facts bearing on an
issue of constitutional. law,"' 9 the Ninth Circuit nevertheless declined to
exercise such independent judgment.
The key question under the third step of the Central Hudson test is
whether the TCPA directly advances a significant governmental interest.
Preservation of people's privacy in their own homes is clearly a
significant governmental interest 20 and the plaintiffs did not dispute that
it is. The question of whether that interest is directly advanced by the
TCPA provisions relating to ADADs is more problematic. As indicated
above, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to sustain an invasion of
privacy rationale for the imposition of speech restrictions unless the

116.

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
117. Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360,365-66 (D. Or. 1993).
118. Moser,46 F.3d at 972, 974.
119. Id. at 974.
120. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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invasion is "essentially intolerable"' 2' either because it is taaavoidable or
because it presents the opportunity f3r coercion.'2
1.

Unavoidability

The Court found sound trucks in a residential neighborhood,"z ads on
public carriers, 124 and direct mailings received by the injured or
bereaved' 21 to be examples of unavoidable invasions which merited
government's protection. Obscene messages displayed in public' 26 and
inserts included with utility bills' 27 were held to be avoidable and thus to
constitute no intolerable invasion of privacy. The distinction lies in the
ability of the message recipient easily to shun unwanted speech.
A telephone call adds an interesting twist to the avoidability problem
because, unlike other methods of communication, it intnides upon the
listener in two ways. First is the ring, which may or may not represent an
unwanted intrusion, depending upon the hearer's predisposition at the
time it occurs. Second is the message, which, again, may or may not be
welcome. The two are clearly separable and independent in their
desirability: the ring may be unwelcome as it drags you out of the shower
but the message very welcome when you learn that Ed McMahon is on
the line with your $10 million prize. Courts considering the TCPA ban
have not effectively distinguished the ring from the message. 28 The
Ninth Circuit repeated this mistake and, by implying that the purpose of
the ban is to reduce the number of rings that interrupt residents' privacy,
concluded that the ban directly advances a significant governmental
interest. But this conclusion misses the point because the ban singles out
a specific type of message as the means of reducing the numiber of rings.
The First Amendment analysis is more properly directed to the invasive
properties of the message itself, and whether hearers can easily avoid an
unwanted message, not whether they can avoid unwanted rings. As the
Supreme Court noted in Breard v. City of Alexandria, the law has
traditionally treated a knocker on the front door as an "invitation or
121. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,21 (1971). See supranote 65 and accompanying text.
122. See supra part II.B.
123. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
124. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
125. Florida Bar v. Went For It,Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
126. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
127. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
128. See, e.g., State v. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1992), cert. denied,507 U.S.
1006 (1993).
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license to attempt an entry," which the homeowners can withdraw by
their notice or order;'29 similarly a phone number-a listed phone
number at any rate-is an invitation to ring which can be withdrawn by
unlisting the number.
Once an individual has answered the phone, the question becomes
whether the message is itself an intolerable invasion that cannot be
avoided. It is not. Just as the Consolidated Edison customer can toss out
any unwanted message that comes with a bill, the hearer of an unwanted
phone solicitation message can avoid it simply by hanging up. The
Supreme Court has already suggested that the availability of this selfhelp measure vitiates an invasion of privacy concern.' 3
2.

Coercion

The Supreme Court has found a legitimate state interest in preventing
coercion strong enough to overcome a First Amendment challenge only
where trained persuaders have the opportunity to exercise their skills
during the course of an in-person dialogue. 3 ' The Court rejected the
possibility of manipulative persuasion occurring via the telephone in
Edenfield, 1"2 but, in as much as the Court had judged that the soliciting
party-a CPA-lacked as a matter of professional training the advocacy
skills necessary to make the possibility of coercion a viable threat, the
decision does not stand for the proposition that solicitation via telephone
would never furnish sufficient opportunity for coercion to merit
regulation.
Only one circuit court has considered the problem of telephone
solicitation in this context. The Fourth Circuit, 33 applying the Central
Hudson test to a West Virginia statute that banned door-to-door and live
telephone sales of "preneed" funeral services, rejected a First
Amendment challenge, noting that while salespeople are less persuasive
over the phone than in person, they nevertheless retain the ability to
129. 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951) (upholding ban on door-to-door solicitors because of low value
then assigned to commercial speech); see supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text. In contrast, the
Court had already stricken down an Ohio ban on door-to-door distribution of religious pamphlets,
holding that First Amendment rights prevailed over a municipality's desire to insure the peace and
quiet of its residents. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
130. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1993).
131. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
132. 507 U.S. at 775. See supranote 81 and accompanying text.
133. National Funeral Servs, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 870 F.2d 136 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
966 (1989).
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"adapt to a consumer's responses" and change their sales pitch "to
exploit particular vulnerabilities."' 3 ' This reasoning is entirely consistent
with the psychology implicit in the Court's discussion of the issue.'35 The
Fourth Circuit explicitly declined to extend its reasoning to "the issue of
whether telemarketing performed by an automated message player would
pose the same risks."' 36
C.

Crafting a More Reasonable Fit

The final prong of the Central Hudson test mandates an inquiry into
whether there is a reasonable fit between the governmental interest
served by a regulation and the means by which it is advanced. The Court
has held that a restriction need not be the least restrictive possible, but
that it must be "no more extensive than reasonably necessary" to advance
At this stage the test is
the substantial governmental interest.'
substantially similar to the time, place or manner test announced by the
Ninth Circuit in that it too seeks to determine if a statute is overly
broad.' The appeals court did not, however, apply the test with any
rigor; rather, it merely noted the trial court's finding that Congress had
"considered and rejected less restrictive forms of regulation" and moved
on to adjudicate based on the matter of alternative channels of
communication. '
The restrictions rejected by Congress were in fact more narrowly
tailored to serve the interests of preserving home privacy without placing
a complete ban on the commercial use of ADADs. Measures considered
included maintaining a mandatory, comprehensive opt-off list for
individuals who did not wish to be bothered by automated sales calls. 40
The TCPA authorizes the maintenance of a national database of those
who do not wish to be solicited by phone, but automated calls are
specifically omitted from this form of less restrictive regulation in favor
of the complete ban. 4' This form of opt-off list has been upheld in regard
134. Id. at 144.
135. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
136. NationalFuneralServices, 870 F.2d 136, 143 n.13.
137. Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.3. 469, 477 (1989)
(quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,207 (1982)).
138. Fox, 492 U.S. at 477. See supra text accompanying note 108.
139. Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir.) (citing Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360, 365 (D.
Or. 1993)), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2615 (1995).
140. H.R. Rep. No. 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20 (1991).
141. 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(c)(3), (6) (West Supp. 1994).
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to a postal regulation requiring the maintenance of such a list to protect
those who wish to avoid receiving sexually-oriented mail. 42 The
availability of an opt-off procedure for other forms of telemarketing
suggests strongly that a similar measure might have served for regulating
ADAD calls in a manner short of a complete ban.
Other suggested methods of keeping unwanted messages from hearers
include obtaining their consent to hear the message by pressing one of
the buttons on their phone if, after a brief introduction, they are willing to
hear the message.'4 3 Prosecution and private rights of action for multiple
or otherwise excessively bothersome calls present another less restrictive
avenue for protecting privacy rights,'" as do time-of-day limits to
prevent calling during dinner and evening hours. 45
V.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court's view of commercial speech has evolved
from the contempt and hostility displayed in Breard and Chrestensen
into the respectful understanding of its place in the free enterprise system
that informed the decision in Virginia Pharmacy. The TCPA, with its
outright ban on the commercial use of Automatic Dialing Announcing
Devices, violates the spirit of the Court's appraisal that commercial
speech provides the information necessary for responsible consumer
choices as well as the letter of the law set out in the CentralHudson test.
An overbroad set of regulations that unfairly singles out the commercial
use of recorded phone messages fails to substantially advance the
government's interest in protecting home privacy and excludes measures
that would address privacy concerns in an even-handed manner without
unduly burdening the First Amendment rights of small businesses.
The Supreme Court noted in Struthers that "door to door distribution
146
of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people."'
142. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
143. Ann Marie Arcadi, Note, What About the Lucky Leprechaun?: An Argument Against "The
Telephone Consumer ProtectionAct of 1991 ", 1991 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 417, 430-31 (noting that a
device capable of doing this is already on the market and arguing that current and future
technological innovations for solving the problem of unwanted solicitations are precluded by the
TCPA's complete ban).
144. The TCPA already provides for state, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (f)(l)-(2), and private, 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 227 (c)(5), civil action against permitted telemarketing which fails to abide by the opt-off
regulations.
145. Current FCC regulations prevent otherwise permitted types of telemarketing calls before 8
a.m. and after 9 p.m. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) (1995).
146. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
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By failing to apply the CentralHuidson test for its examination of the
TCPA in Moser, the Ninth Circuit has shut down a useful informational
avenue for the poorly financed small and start-up businesses that need to
inform consumers of their innova.ive products and efficiently priced
services, and it has foreclosed the opportunity for those consumers to
receive information that may be of value to them.

